

The Fourth International



Critical Infrastructure Security
Showdown - Online
2020

Event Plan V8.2

Sponsors:

National Research Foundation, Singapore

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Event Team:

Event oversight and management

Mark Goh

Beebi Siti Salimah Binte

Liyakkathali

Ian Jia Hao Teo

Technical support

Ivan Lee

Muhammad Syuqri Bin Johanna

Siddhant Shrivastava

Francisco Caetano Dos Remedios

Furtado

Tools

Aditya P Mathur

Gauthama Raman Mani Iyer

Ramani

Athalye Surabhi Sachin

Ivan Lee

Siddhant Shrivastava

Student helpers

Madhumitha Balaji

Yu Hui Lau

Yang Zhi Lim

Jo-shen Ng

Li Yuan Tan

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Version History

Version No.	8.2
Effective Date	13 Apr 2020
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Major Revision(s)	Version 2.0, 14 Apr 2020: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Whole document; added sub-paragraphs • Para 3.1 (b) & (c): anonymity for blue teams but not observers • Para 3.3.2: added information on scheduling for target system selection phase • Figure 1: replaced PlantViz with PlantViz [OT] in web interface
	Version 3.0, 6 May 2020: Para 3.1.1 : Updated red teams' makeup
	Version 4.0, 13 May 2020: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Para 3.1.1: Increased number of red teams to 16 • Para 3.2.2: Added criterion for blue teams • Para 3.4.1 (removed): Removed criteria in which a red team may qualify for 2 CFMs • Para 3.4.4: Updated cash awards for top three red teams • Figure 1: Renamed "Ticketing system" to "Attack logger"
	Version 5.0, 28 May 2020: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Para 3.4.4: Updated scoring criteria for red teams • Para 3.4.6: Added section on reporting of alerts by blue teams
	Version 6.0, 12 June 2020: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Table 1: Corrected typo on date • Para 3.2.1: Added schedule for participant familiarisation • Para 3.2.4: Added info on hardware setup for blue teams • Para 3.2.5: Added info on remote monitoring by blue teams

Major Revision(s)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Para 3.4.5: Combined paras 3.4.5 and 3.4.6 on Attack detection and reporting of alerts by blue teams • Figure 1: Revamped • Figure 3: Added figure for interactions between red/blue teams with CISS2020-OL systems and tools during CyberFire • Figure 4: Added figure for blue teams monitoring their systems' GUI remotely • Para 5: Added nomenclature of tools deployed by iTrust
	<p>Version 7.0, 3 Jul 2020:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Para 3.3: Updated target selection procedure • Para 3.4.2.3: Digital twin is removed from CyberFire phase • Para 3.4.4: Updated scoring formulae • Blacklisted targets: updated • Annex A (Attack Designer and Launcher): removed
	<p>Version 8.2, 21 Jul 2020:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Para 3.4.3: Updated attack monitoring • Para 3.4.4: Only single attacks in series are allowed • Para 3.4.4.1 and para 3.4.4.2: added attack examples to increase clarity of scoring

1. Objectives

1.1 CISS2020-OL aims to meet the following key objectives: (a) validate and assess the effectiveness of technologies developed by researchers associated with iTrust¹; (b) develop capabilities for defending critical infrastructure under emergency situations such as cyber-attacks; and (c) understand composite Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) for enhanced Operation Security (OpSec).

1.2 In addition, CISS2020-OL will enable red team members to understand approaches for compromising critical infrastructure and hence what protection mechanisms are necessary.

2. History

CISS2020-OL will be the fourth annual cyber defence exercise conducted annually by iTrust. The exercise began in 2015 under the event named Secure Cyber-Physical (SCy-Phy) Systems Week. In 2019 it was renamed as Critical Infrastructure Security Showdown (CISS) to better reflect its purpose and domain. CISS2020-OL will be the first time the event is **fully online, where all participants, i.e. red and blue teams, will launch and monitor attacks online, respectively, from wherever they are based.**

3. Phases in CISS2020-OL²

The event consists of the following time-sequenced phases:

Phase I [May 4 - 29, 2020]	:	Participant selection (red & blue teams, observers)
Phase II [June 22 - July 3, 2020]	:	Participant familiarisation (red & blue teams)
Phase II-A [June 22]		Blue team briefing
Phase II-B [June 29]		Red team briefing
Phase II-C [TBC]		Judge briefing

¹ At the time of writing this document, these technologies include automatically generated anomaly detectors using both design and data centric approaches, protection against plant damage, and tools to assist with incidence response

² Note that this document is being developed while various technologies for use in CISS2020-OL are under development. Hence, iTrust reserves the right to make changes in the procedure described here in the event all the needed technologies are not available at the time of the CyberFire exercise.

- Phase III [July 6 - 16, 2020]** : Target system selection (red teams)
- Phase IV [July 27 - Aug 7, 2020]** : CyberFire (red & blue teams, observers)
- Phase V [Q3 – Q4, 2020]** : Data analysis and reporting

Throughout the document there will be several mentions of the tools deployed by iTrust to manage the entire exercise. Red and blue teams are encouraged to familiarise themselves with these terms by referring to [paragraph 5](#).

3.1. Phase I: Participant selection

3.1.1. Participation in CISS2020-OL is by invitation only. Participants will be classified into red teams, blue teams and observers. The makeup of participants in each category follows:

- a) Red teams (up to 6 members):
 - Up to 16 local and international teams from government organisations, private sector and academia.
- b) Blue teams (no limit on the number of members):
 - One from iTrust
 - Commercial vendors will be invited based on their past performance in similar events and nominations by Singapore Government agencies
 - Academia from centres around the world that have cyber-security as their prime focus and have demonstrated research record in securing critical infrastructure
 - **The anonymity of blue teams is maintained throughout.**
- c) Observers: Singapore Government agencies and their invitees. iTrust will execute the event online from where any authorised observer can track the progress - in terms of attacks launched and detected - of the event.

3.2. Phase II: Participant familiarisation

3.2.1. All red and blue teams will be offered an online tour of the [Secure Water Treatment \(SWaT\)](#) testbed – one of the target systems (see para 3.3) – and have their questions answered. The schedule is as follows:

- Blue Teams: 22 Jun, 9am – 11am, SUTD, Lecture Theatre 3 (Building 2, Level 4)
- Red Teams: 29 Jun, 4pm – 6pm, online

3.2.2. In addition, the red and blue teams will also be provided:

- information on SWaT, the digital twin, digital twin player, and various anomaly detection and plant safety technologies that will be deployed during the exercise;
- a Frequently Answered Questions (FAQs) (provided separately); and
- access to past data collected from SWaT since 2015, including data collected during CISS 2019.

3.2.3. Blue teams that need to perform hardware installations in SWaT are provided slots to do so (3.2.4). Whenever possible, iTrust will set aside time to supervise the installation by the blue team. Importantly, each blue team shall ensure that:

- The installations do not disturb the regular plant operation and interfere with existing iTrust technologies;
- It will make its own arrangements for the data generated by its hardware to be piped to their computers outside of the SWaT during the exercise;
- The installations respond as if in a real-time environment;
- The installations (hardware and software) be completely removed post-exercise and restore SWaT to its original condition. The blue team shall bear any cost for damages arising from the installation and/or teardown of the upgrades; and
- There shall be no efforts made to prevent, halt or thwart any attacks launched by the red teams.

3.2.4. iTrust will not provide any additional hardware / software for installation / setup / GUI display to blue teams, should there be any physical equipment to be set up in SWaT. Each blue team will be provided up to 3 slots of 2 hours per slot during working weekdays to install its hardware.

3.2.5. Blue teams' systems will be connected to iTrust's TAP switch to receive pcap data from Zycron Cyber City and SWaT (see [Figure 4](#)). Two Ethernet cables will be provided for this purpose. **As blue teams will not have physical access to SWaT, they will need to set up remote monitoring capabilities to view their systems' GUI off-site over SUTD's WiFi or its own 4G router.**

3.2.6. For details on attack detection and reporting by blue teams, please refer to paragraph [3.4.5](#).

3.3. Phase III: Target system selection

3.3.1. During this Phase III, each red team will be provided with up to 10 instances of data collected from SWaT and its digital twin, referred to as Target 1, Target 2, ...Target 10. This set of 10 instances will include some dataset generated from SWaT and others generated from the digital twin. A higher score is given if the red team successfully selects SWaT as the target (see para [3.4.4](#) for details on scoring.)

3.3.2. All red teams will be asked to select a 2-hour slot on the [CISS2020-OL website](#) for target selection . There are two ways in which red teams can choose to analyse the dataset:

- a) Use the 2-hour slot to connect to Cloud VM and view the datasets; or
- b) Download the datasets 48 hours prior to their 2-hour slots and analyse them.

Details of both options are as follows:

Option 1: Use 2-hour slot to connect to Cloud VM

3.3.3. Red teams will be provided unique credentials to connect to Cloud VM 30 minutes before their target selection timeslot. OT data captured by the historian by each target system i.e., Target 1, Target 2, ...Target 10 from SWaT and the digital twin historians will be available on the Cloud VM and can be viewed through PEPPR-PV and PEPPR-PP. Figure 1 on the next page captures the interactions between a red team and the targets. Note that ZCC (see para 3.4.1) will not be available during this phase.




Figure 1: Interactions between red team and CISS2020-OL system and tools during target selection phase

3.3.4. Red teams will be provided unique credentials to connect to Cloud VM 30 minutes before their target selection timeslot. OT data captured by the historian by each target system i.e., Target 1, Target 2, ...Target 10 from SWaT and the digital twin historians will be available on the Cloud VM and can be viewed through PEPPR-PV and PEPPR-PP.

3.3.5. Each red team will then be asked to make known their target system selection to iTrust via email (to itrust@sutd.edu.sg), **within 2 hours** from the end of their target selection slot; they will then be informed if their selected target system is SWaT or one of its digital twin variant. This selected target system shall be the one in which they will launch their attacks during the next phase: the CyberFire exercise. **Bonus points will be awarded to the red teams who are able to correctly select the physical SWaT testbed instead of its digital twin.**

Option 2: Download the datasets 48 hours prior to their 2-hour slots

3.3.6. If the red team selects this option, the datasets will be made available for download by the red team 48 hours before its target selection slot (e.g. if the slot it chose is Wednesday, 4pm (GMT+8) then the link to download the dataset will be sent to it on Monday, 4pm (GMT+8). The red team will then have this 48 hours to make know its selection to iTrust.

3.3.7. **Regardless of its selection (whether it chose SWaT or digital twin) during this phase, a red team will be given the full four hours to launch attacks on SWaT.**

3.4. Phase IV: CyberFire activities

The CyberFire activities will be spread over 16 CFM (Table 1). The duration of each CFM slot is 4 hours and is scheduled from 9am to 1pm or from 2pm to 6pm, GMT+8, with a one-hour break in between for system reset. The red team attack schedule will be announced on the [website](#) two weeks before the exercise.

Table 1: CISS2020-OL Schedule for red teams

Week 1		Week 2	
Date	CFM slot	Date	CFM slot
Mon July 27	1 (AM)	Mon Aug 3	9 (AM)
	SR		SR
	2 (PM)		10 (PM)
Tue July 28	3 (AM)	Tue Aug 4	11 (AM)
	SR		SR
	4 (PM)		12 (PM)
Wed July 29	5 (AM)	Wed Aug 5	13 (AM)
	SR		SR
	6 (PM)		14 (PM)
Thu July 30	7 (AM)	Thu Aug 6	15 (AM)
	SR		SR
	8 (PM)		16 (PM)
Fri July 31	No activity; Public holiday	Fri Aug 7	Data distribution Award announcements

CFM: CyberFire Module; red teams attack a target system; SR: System reset (1 hour)
AM slot: 0900 – 1300; PM slot: 1400 – 1800, GMT +8

3.4.1. Attack platform

For added realism, all red teams must attack SWaT by first entering the network via the ZyCron Cyber City (ZCC); they will land in ZCC's corporate network through a VPN connection. ZCC (Figure 2) is a full-fledged virtual organisation comprising of

Information Technology (e.g., e-mail server, file server, printer server, CCTV, honeypot and intranet) and Operational Technology (processes similar to those in SWaT). To make these entities “alive,” various types of network traffic are also crafted and included in ZCC. As an IT environment ZCC is not set up with best practices i.e., it is intentionally built with minimum security features and contains vulnerabilities for red teams to explore and exploit. Note that there is no internet access within the ZCC.




Figure 2: High-level Architecture of ZyCron Cyber City

3.4.2. Launching attacks

3.4.2.1. Active stage

During a CFM the active red team will be asked to demonstrate its attacks and achieve the pre-determined goals (see para 3.4.4 for details on scoring). At this time, the red team is considered “active” and will have online access to its pre-selected target system via a VPN connection. The CFM duration includes, but is not limited to: reconnaissance, designing and launching attacks, interactions with judges (e.g., for Attack Logging; see Figure 3) and taking breaks.

3.4.2.2. Hunting stage

As indicated in para 3.4.1, **all red teams must enter SWaT via the ZCC to launch attacks.** Failure to do so and to identify the pre-selected target system will lead to a lower score. If, during its CFM slot, attempts to penetrate into SWaT

network through ZCC corporate network are unsuccessful after 30 mins (request to extend to up to 60 mins will be considered), the team may proceed to attack SWaT or the digital twin (whichever was selected as the target in the selection phase; see also scoring criteria.)

ZCC is built with typical enterprise vulnerabilities that exist in many organisations. The red team will first have to “hunt” for these vulnerabilities and compromise them before using them to “hop” deeper into the network and eventually locate SWaT/digital twin in the OT network.

3.4.2.3. Attack launch stage

Active teams will design and launch attacks on SWaT for four hours (see Figure 3). Note that digital twin is not available at this stage.




Figure 3: Interactions between red/blue teams with CISS2020-OL systems and tools during CyberFire

Prior to launching attacks, the active red team **must do the following throughout its CFM:**

- Share with iTrust the “live” screen of the computer that is used to launch the attack via an online communication tool (e.g. Skype)³;
- Allow iTrust to video record the screen; and

³ This is purely for iTrust’s post-event analysis and report writing purposes; recordings will not be shared or made public with anyone without written permission by the red team

- c. Inform judges (1) the intention of the attack; (2) the targeted component(s); and (3) the launch procedure.

The duration of an attack will be determined in real time by iTrust's cyber security technology engineers stationed physically at SWaT. Attacks that take a long time, e.g., 30 minutes, to have a noticeable impact on the plant will likely be halted by the judges before the impact is visible.

3.4.3. Attack monitoring

Any anomaly resulting from the attack, or otherwise (i.e., a false alarm), and reported by one or more iTrust detectors, will be visible **only to the organisers, observers and judges and not to the red or blue teams.**

3.4.4. Scoring of red teams

The performance of each red team will be assessed in real time by a team of judges consisting of cyber security experts and engineers working in the critical infrastructure domain. **Only single attacks, in series (one starts only after the previous one has ended), are allowed.** All teams that successfully complete the exercise will be given a certificate of participation. Judges during the event will score each team based on criteria such as complexity of the attacks launched and success of the attack in resulting in an anomaly in at least one of the plant state variables. **Top three red teams will receive cash awards of S\$2,000, S\$1,000 and S\$500 respectively.** Scoring will be based on the following individual elements.

The total score, S , for each attack launched is computed based on five factors t , p , a_t , a_{sd} and b . These are described in detail below.

$$\text{Total score, } S = t + p * (a_{t1}a_{sd1} + a_{t2} a_{sd1} \dots a_{tn} a_{sdn}) + b$$

where:

- t = target selection modifier
 - *Selected SWaT ($t = 150$) or one of the digital twins ($t = 0$) during target selection*
- p = point of entry modifier
 - *All red teams must attack SWaT by first entering the network via the*

ZCC (para 3.4.2.); $p = 1$

- If attempts to enter ZCC are unsuccessful after 30 mins (request to extend to up to 60 will be considered), the team may proceed to attack SWaT or the digital twin (whichever was selected as the target in the selection phase) directly; $p = 0.75$
- a_t = an **attack target** is a physical component or parameter in the plant on which the red team wants to launch the attack. An attack target differs from the **attack intention** which is defined as the intended impact as a result of the attack on the target. For example, to cause a water tank to overflow (attack intention), an attacker may choose to launch an attack on a valve (attack target) by setting it to the CLOSED condition long enough, without getting detected, so that a continuous flow of water into the tank is maintained. The 12 attack targets⁴, and their corresponding points in parentheses, if an attack is successful, in SWaT are:
 - Conductivity meter (300)
 - Flowmeter (200)
 - Historian⁴ (100)
 - Water level meter (200)
 - Oxidation Reduction Potential Meter (300)
 - pH meter (300)
 - PLCs (100)
 - Pressure meter (200)
 - Pumps (200)
 - SCADA (100)
 - Network switches (100)
 - Valves (200)
- a_{sd} = attack success and detection modifier: whether an attack results in an anomaly, and whether the anomaly/attack is detected by any of the

⁴ Activities or actions that would interfere, obstruct or disturb Participants, iTrust and running of the Exercise are strictly prohibited. In addition, the following will not be available for attack:

- Hypervisors
- 10.10.0.0/16
- 1.2.222.0/24
- 9.9.0.0/16
- Server rack: The server rack should not be attacked through physical layer
- Historian: Do not directly try to compromise the historian. We use it to record data for later analysis. You may, however, manipulate data sent to the historian
- General electric supply, fire alarm systems etc.: please do not manipulate the overall setup on a scale that affects more than the testbed setup (e.g., trigger university-wide fire alarm or similar).

installed detectors.

- $a_{sd} = s * d$
- If the attack is successful, $s = 1$; else $s = 0$
- d is calculated as:

↓ d	s →	Attack results in an anomaly	Attack does not result in an anomaly
Anomaly/attack is observed*		0.7	-0.2
Anomaly/attack is not observed*		1	0

**through physical observations of the plant and SCADA screen by plant operator and judges*

- b = bonus points for novel attacks (such as the ability to disrupt the anomaly detectors), at the discretion of the judges

3.4.4.1. Attack example 1: Different attack vectors on the same attack target

The red team will be awarded for both attack methods since they found a new way to disrupt the pump even though the impact is same. This rewards their creativity and reveals weaknesses in the IT/OT networks. Additional points will be given if they can use same IT methods to reach different OT consequences according to the scoring guide in section 3.4.4.

For example, consider the following attacks in a chronological order during a red team's CyberFire session:

- Attack Pump P101 using method 1 – counted
- Attack Pump P101 using method 2 – counted
- Attack Pump P301 using method 1 – not counted (as it has already been demonstrated earlier)
- Attack P101, P301 with either methods, and reach a new OT outcome/anomaly at the plant level – will be counted as long as the new OT outcome can be well-demonstrated. This aims to reward their systems knowledge as a whole as opposed to using particular techniques to target individual components.

3.4.4.2. Attack example 2: Different attack intentions (and implementations) that share common elements

As an example, performing attack intention X using elements A, B and PLC and performing a separate attack intention Y using elements C, D and PLC, the PLC here is the common element.

Each of A-D and the PLC will get their own individual points as long as they are all unique. If the combination as a whole has a new attack target (disrupting a process via OT attacks), then that will fetch additional points as well.

However, repeating the same steps again for a similar impact will not fetch additional points.

3.4.5. Attack detection and reporting of alerts by blue teams

It is important for blue teams to note that CISS2020-OL is being conducted to simulate attacks on a live city-scale plant. Hence, it is assumed that the security systems deployed by each blue team are operational throughout the exercise except when the target system, i.e., SWaT or the digital twin, is not running or is being reset.

3.4.5.1. Attack detection

Throughout the event the blue teams will monitor their systems remotely (Figure 4 next page). Post-event, blue teams will be given pcap and OT data captured for analysis. To recap para 3.2.3, **there shall be no effort made by the blue teams to prevent, halt or thwart any attacks launched by the red teams.**




Figure 4: Blue teams monitoring their systems' GUI remotely

3.4.5.2. Reporting of alerts

The above assumption implies that any alert generated by the security system deployed by a blue team must be reported ***immediately*** to the plant operator ***automatically, not manually***. While each blue team will be provided all event data, e.g., pcap files and Historian data, at the end of the event, they are not expected to conduct an analysis of an alert generated ***during*** the event. ***Again, each alert must be reported immediately as if it is occurring in a live plant and being reported to the plant operator.***

Reporting of alerts to iTrust by blue teams must be done so in one of the following two ways:

- a) PEPPR-PV: this would require the blue team to work with iTrust's developer to integrate with it, so that its detections/alerts can be sent to PEPPR-PV for automatic logging and visual alerts; or
- b) Alert logger: a simple password-protected interface to manually log a time-stamped alert each time the blue team detects an attack.

3.5. Phase V: Data analysis and reporting

3.5.1 Data from each active target will be recorded and saved in the iTrust data library. Note that part of this data will be from the SWaT testbed while the remaining will be from instances of the digital twins.

3.5.2 Data recorded will consist of measurements from all sensors in each target as well as network packets saved into pcap files. This data will be available publicly via the iTrust data library for use by researchers. Note that the recorded data will contain data mutated by the red teams. Process anomalies generated during the exercise and reported by blue teams will not be a part of the recorded data available publicly.

3.5.3 iTrust will begin data analysis soon after the end of the exercise. The analysis will result in metrics such as the number and types of attacks launched, success rate, detection rate (and false positives), and time taken to detect. Technologies developed in iTrust, and tested during the exercise, will also be evaluated and the outcome included in the event report.

4. Acceptance of Terms & Conditions

Participants who register for this exercise are deemed to have read and accepted all the terms and conditions set out in this document. iTrust reserves the right to change these terms and conditions at any time up until the exercise, without prior notice.

5. Nomenclature

Alert Logger: Automates the process of logging and sending time-stamped alerts by blue teams to iTrust

Attack Launcher: Optional platform for red teams to select and launch attacks

Attack Logger: Communicate attack intentions & steps to White Team & judges and log attacks as they happen

PEPPR: Collection of tools (PlantPlayer (PP), PlantViz (PV) and PlantIO (PI)) that allows playback of historical data to enable blue teams to test their own detection systems

PEPPR-PP: Tool to playback past historical data

iTrust Player V1.1: Target Selection Mode
[Build: June 6, 2020]

Twin mode: Recorded Plant Data


20/5/2020 10:30:28 AM Start: 20/5/2020 10:30:00 AM Plant run time: 00:00:00:00:28 Next row: 31

LS201	LS202	LSL203	LSLL203	PSH301	DPH301
LS401	LSL601	LSL602	LSH601	LSH602	
LSH603	Unused	Unused	Unused	Unused	Unused

Run at: 1X Data Live Replay Reverse Rows saved: 3 To: 31 Max: 172.80K Mem: 1.18K

PLC1 [2]	MV101:0 0	P101:0.00 0	P102:0.00 0				
	FT101: 0.000	FIT201: 0.409	LIT101: 745.37				
PLC2 [2]	MV201:0 0	P201:0.00 0	P202:0.00 0	P203:0.00 0	P204:0.00 0	P205:0.00 0	P206:0.00 0
	LIT201: NA	LIT202: NA	LIT203: NA	AIT201: 5.191	AIT202: 6.603	AIT203: 147.94	
PLC3 [7]	MV301:0 0	MV302:0 0	MV303:0 0	MV304:0 0	P301:0.00 0	P302:0.00 0	
	FIT301: 1.843	LIT301: 900.77	AIT301: 7.220	AIT302: 119.47	AIT303: 14.726	DRIT301: 15.183	DR: 0.00 Th: 0.00
	UF	UFCycle	UFCCount	UFCycleCount	UFTimer	UFCycleError	BC
	0	0: Standby	0	0	0	None	0
PLC4 [4]	P401:0.00 0	P402:0.00 6	P403:0.00 0	P404:0.00 0	LIV401:0.00 0		
	FIT401: 1.317	LIT401: 547.21 [L]	AIT401: 0.000	AIT402: 0.000			
	UV	UVCycle	UVCCount	UVCycleCount	UVTimer	UVCycleError	None
	1	1: ON UV	0	0	0	None	None
PLC5 [12]	PS01:0.00 0	PS02:0.00 0	MV501:0 0	MV502:0 0	MV503:0 0	MV504:0 0	
	PIT501: 227.63	PIT502: 2.211	PIT503: 201.94	FIT501: 1.322	FIT502: 1.181	FIT503: 0.113	FIT504: 0.000
	AIT501: 7.338	AIT502: 139.02	AIT503: 24.930	AIT504: 0.154	DR: 0.00 Th: 0.00		
	RO	ROCycle	ROCCount	ROCycleCount	ROTimer	ROCycleError	ShutdownCount
	1	1: CHK FF401	0	1	0	None	0

PEPPR-PV: Visualisation tool for live, prediction, and anomaly data from detectors.



PEPPR-PI: A suite of tools that allows detectors to save, publish and playback live, the predicted plant state and alerts. The data which is saved or published can be used by other tools on the same network.

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